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Surviving Spouses' Rights Uncertain: Sullivan v. Burkin' — In Massachusetts, surviving
spouses are protected from disinheritance by section 15 of Massachusetts General Laws,
chapter 191, which allows a surviving spouse to elect against the decedent's will and
receive one-third of the decedent's estate.? Massachusetts testators have been able to
circumvent the statute by using inter vivos conveyances to remove property from their
estate subject to distribution.' Traditionally the only limitation placed on inter vivos
conveyances by Massachusetts courts had been that such conveyances not be "colorable." 4
As interpreted by the Massachusetts courts, "not colorable" means that the conveyance
must be legally binding on the settlor or donor, accomplished in his or her lifetime and
not testamentary in effect.'
In 1984, in the case of Sullivan v. Burkin,6
 the Supreme Judicial Court considered
whether assets held in a trust over which the decedent alone retained the power to direct
disposition of the assets remained part of the decedent's estate subject to distribution.?
In Sullivan, the decedent, Ernest G. Sullivan, and the plaintiff, Sullivan's wife, Mary, had
been separated for many years. 8
 On September 10, 1973, the decedent executed a deed
I 390 Mass. 864, 460 N.E.2d 572 (1984).
2 MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 191, § 15, as appearing in St. 1964, c. 288, 1 (West Supp. 1981).
provides in pertinent part:
The surviving husband or wife of a deceased person ... within six months after the
probate of the will of such deceased, may file in the registry of probate a writing
signed by him or by her ... claiming such portion of the estate of the deceased as he
or she is given the right to claim under this section, and if the deceased left issue, he
or she shall thereupon take one third of the personal and one third of the real
property; ... except that ... if he or she would thus take real and personal property
to an amount exceeding twenty-five thousand dollars in value, he or she shall receive,
in addition to that amount, only the income during his or her life of the excess of his
or her share of such estate above that amount, the personal property to be held in
trust and the real property vested in him or her for life, from the death of the
deceased .... If the real and personal property of the deceased which the surviving
husband or wife takes under the foregoing provisions exceeds twenty-five thousand
dollars in value, and the surviving husband or wife is to take only twenty-five thousand
dollars absolutely, the twenty-five thousand dollars, above given absolutely, shall be
paid out of that part of the personal property in which the husband or wife is
interested; and if such part is insufficient the deficiency shall, upon the petition of
any person interested, be paid from the sale or mortgage in fee, in the manner
provided for the payment of debts or legacies, of that part of the real property in
which he or she is interested.
Id.
3 See Kerwin v. Donaghy, 317 Mass. 559, 59 N.E.2d 299 (1945).
4
 See, e.g., Roche v. Brickley, 254 Mass. 584, 588, 150 N.E. 866, 868 (1926); Kelley v. Snow, 185
Mass. 288, 299, 70 N.E. 89, 94 (1904).
6 Kerwin, 317 Mass. at 572, 59 N.E.2d at 306.
6 390 Mass. 864, 460 N.E.2d 572 (1984).
7 Id. at 867, 460 N.E.2d at 574.
8 1d. at 866, 460 N.E.2d at 574. The Sullivans ceased living together as husband and wife in
February 1947. Brief of the Appellee at 4, Sullivan v. Burkin, 390 Mass. 864, 460 N.E.2d 572
(1984). Mary Sullivan filed a petition for separate support in 1962 with the Norfolk County Probate
Court and was granted an order of temporary support from her husband. Id. Mr. Sullivan did not
meet his support obligation and the petition was still pending (Docket No. 156,372) at the time of
his death. Id.
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of trust, entitled "the Ernest G. Sullivan Trust," through which he transferred real
estate9 to himself as sole trustee. 10 During his lifetime, Mr. Sullivan was to receive the
net income from the trust and could also receive part of the principal from the trustee
upon a request in writing." He retained the power to revoke the trust at any time."
Upon Sullivan's death, the trust instructed the successor trustee, defendant Charles
Burkin, to pay the principal and any undistributed income, in equal shares, to George
F. Cronin, Sr. and Harold J. Cronin, the other defendants in the case.' 3
Sullivan remained the trustee until his death on April 27, 1981)4 He left a will
containing a statement that he "intentionally neglected to make any provisions for my
wife, Mary A. Sullivan and my grandson, Mark Sullivan." 13 The defendants, George F.
Cronin, Sr. and Harold J. Cronin, were named co-executors of the will. 16 The will
provided that, after the payment of debts, expenses and estate and death taxes, the
residue of the estate should be paid to Burkin, the trustee of the inter vivos trust."
On October 20, 1981 the will was allowed, 18 and the next day Mary Sullivan filed a
claim under Massachusetts General Laws, chapter 191, section 15 for her distributive
share of her husband's estate)g Mrs. Sullivan claimed that the trust was an invalid
testamentary disposition and, hence, that the trust assets were part of the decedent's
probate estate and subject to her election under the statute. 2° A judge of the probate
court for Suffolk County rejected Mrs. Sullivan's claim and dismissed the complaint. 21
She appealed the decision and, on July 12, 1983, a panel of the appeals court reported
the case to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. 22
9 The transferred property was a house in West Roxbury worth approximately $80,000485,000
at the time of senior's death. 390 Mass. at 866, 460 N.E.2d at 574.
10 Id. at 865, 460 N.E.2d at 573.
" Id.
12 Id.
13 Id. Neither the court's opinion nor the parties' briefs discussed the relationship between




' 1 Id. at 865-66, 460 N.E.2d at 573-74. At the time of Mr. Sullivan's death, Mary A. Sullivan
was unaware of the will and believed that her husband had died intestate. Brief for the Appellant
at 7, Sullivan v. Burkin, 390 Mass. 864, 460 N.E.2d 572 (1984). She filed a petition (Petition in the
Suffolk County Probate Court Docket No. 514,166) asking to be appointed administratrix of her
husband's estate; this petition was allowed on May 7, 1981. Record Appendix and Exhibits at 41.
On July 3, 1981, Mrs. Sullivan, as adminiitratrix, brought a complaint (Suffolk Probate Court
Docket No. C-2105) seeking a judgment declaring the trust created by her husband void and the
trust assets part of his estate. Id. at 3.
On May 11, George F. Cronin, Sr. and Harold]. Cronin, the remaindermen of The Ernest G.
Sullivan Trust, filed the decedent's will with a petition that they be appointed co-executors of the
will. Id. at 46. Mary Sullivan opposed the appointment of the Cronins as executors but withdrew
her opposition on the condition that she be allowed to continue to prosecute her complaint seeking
the invalidation of the trust. Brief for the Appellant at 9, Sullivan v. Burkin, 390 Mass. 864, 460
N.E.2d 572 (1984).
"'Brief for Appellant at 10, Sullivan v. Burkin, 390 Mass. 864, 460 N.E.2d 572 (1984).
C9 390 Mass. at 866, 460 N.E.2d at 574.
" Id, at 866-67, 460 N.E.2d at 574.
21 Id. at 865, 460 N.E.2d at 573.
22 Id. The report stated:
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The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled that the trust was not testamentary
and was an effective, valid inter vivos trust." Accordingly, the court held that the assets
were outside the decedent's estate and, thus, Mary A. Sullivan had no right to share in
the Ernest G. Sullivan Trust assets under Massachusetts General .Laws chapter 191,
section 15.24 The court, however, ruled prospectively that henceforth a decedent's estate
shall include, for the purposes of the elective share statute, the value of assets held in
an inter vivos trust created by the deceased spouse as to which the deceased spouse
alone retained the power during his or her lifetime to direct the disposition for his or
her benefit. 25
In Sullivan, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts provided greater protec-
tion for surviving spouses by adopting a new rule which allows assets of an inter vivos
trust to be considered part of the decedent's estate under the elective share statute. The
Sullivan court acknowledged, however, that this rule will be of little assistance in cases
where the facts are even slightly dissimilar to those in Sullivan. The court . also refused
to address issues which were not expressly necessary to the resolution of the case. Many
important issues concerning the effect of inter vivos transfers challenged under elective
share laws are, therefore, left unresolved after the court's decision. Thus, while the
Sullivan decision alerts practitioners that changes in this area are inevitable, the case
provides estate planners little basis for predicting these changes. Given the unpredictable
nature of a spouse's rights after Sullivan, the case will likely necessitate a revision of the
current elective share statute by the Massachusetts legislature.
This casenote will begin by discussing the various forms of protection against dis-
inheritance available to surviving spouses under current statutory law." The next section
will examine the state of a surviving spouse's rights under Massachusetts law prior to
Sullivan." The court's decision in Sullivan will then be discussed." Finally, the casenote
will analyze the resultant problems from the limited applicability of the court's reasoning
and will offer suggestions on how those problems could have been avoided and how
they may be rectified in the future."
It appearing to the undersigned justices of the court before whom this case was argued
that the case presents a question of unusual public and legal significance (G.L. c. 211A,
§ 10[13]) and may, in light of the recent discussion within the American Law Institute
(see Restatement [Second] of Property — Donative Transfers. § 13.7 [Supp. to Tent.
Draft No. 5, August 25, 1982]), raise some question as to the present vitality of such
cases as Kerwin v. Donaghy, 317 Mass. 559, 572, 59 N.E.2d 299 (1945), the said justices
hereby report this case for consideration and determination of the Supreme Judicial
Court.
Id. at 865 n.2, 460 N.E.2d at 573 n.2.
23 Id. at 868, 460 N.E.2d at 575 (citing Ascher v. Cohen, 333 Mass. 397, 400, 131 N.E.2d 198
(1956); Leahy v. Old Colony Trust Co., 326 Mass. 49, 51, 93 N.E.2d 238, 239 (1950); Kerwin v.
Donaghy, 317 Mass. 559, 567, 59 N.E.2d 299, 304 (1945); National Shawmut Bank v. Joy, 315
Mass. 457, 473-75, 53 N.E.2d 113, 123-24 (1944); Kelley v. Snow, 185 Mass. 288, 298-99, 70 N.E.
89, 94 (1904)).
24 390 Mass. at 871, 460 N.E.2d at 577.
25
 Id. at 867, 460 N.E.2d at 574-75.
26 See infra text accompanying notes 30-143.
27 See infra text accompanying notes 144-76.
" See infra text accompanying notes 177-212.
" See infra text accompanying notes 213-91.
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I. SURVIVING SPOUSE'S PROTECTION FROM DISINHERITANCE
At common law, widows and widowers were protected against disinheritance by the
rights of dower and curtesy. 3° Dower entitled a wife to a life estate in one-third of the
real property held by her husband during marriage and which could have descended to
the issue of the marriage." Curtesy entitled the husband to a life estate in all of the
wife's realty if there were issue of the marriage."
Today, virtually all states have abolished common-law dower and curtesy33 for two
primary reasons. First, as the American economy changed from an agricultural one to
an industrial one, wealth became more concentrated in personalty. 34 Because dower and
curtesy established rights solely in realty, these concepts ceased to provide spouses with
adequate protection against disinheritance." Second, the wife's expectancy in the hus-
band's estate, "inchoate dower," restricted free alienation of realty."
As a result of the general abolition of common-law dower and curtesy, nearly every
state presently provides protection from disinheritance for a surviving spouse. In com-
munity-property states," this protection is afforded by the one-half interest each spouse
has in marital assets." With the exception of Georgia and South Carolina, all of the
remaining common-law property states and the District of Columbia protect surviving
spouses through elective share statutes." These statutes typically guarantee the surviving
5° Sayre, Husband and Wife as Statutory Heirs, 42 HARV. L. REV. 330, 330 (1929).
3 ' I AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 5.1, at 616 (Casner ed. 1952 & Supp. 1977) [hereinafter 1
LAW OF PROPERTY]; 3 C. VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAw § 188, at 345 (1935).
32 Sayre, supra note 30, at 330.
33 Kurtz, The Augmented Estate Concept under the Uniform Probate Code: In Search of an Equitable
Elective Share, 62 Iowa L. REv. 981, 989 (1977).
34 See generally 1 LAw OF PROPERTY, supra note 31, § 5.5, at 631; 3 C. VERNIER, supra note 31,
§ 189, 351-54; 1 W. WALSH, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 101, at 110 (1947).
55 W. WALSH, supra note 34, § 101, at 110.
36 Id.
37 The community property states are Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New
Mexico, Washington and Texas. Mahoney, Elective Share Statutes: The Right to Elect Against Property
Subject to a General Power of Appointment in the Decedent, 55 NOTRE DAME LAw. 99, 100 (1979).
33 See, e.g., 2 AMERICAN LAw or PROPERTY § 7.1. (Casner ed. 1952 & Supp. 1977) [hereinafter
2 LAW OF PROPERTY]. All property acquired, other than by gift, bequest or devise, by either spouse,
comprises the couple's marital assets. Id.
59 ALA. CODE 43, § 43-1-15 (1977); ALASKA STAT. §§ 13.11.070-11.100 (1972 & Supp. 1982);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 60-501 (1971); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-201 (Supp. 1980); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 45-273a (1981); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§ 901, 902 (1979); D.C. CODE ANN. § 19-113
(1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 732.201, 732.206, 732.207 (West Supp. 1983); HAWAII REV. STAT.
§ 560:2-201 (1976 & Supp. 1978); IDAHO CODE § 15-2-201 (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, § 2-8
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978); IND. CODE § 29-1-3-1 (1976); Iowa CODE § 633.238 (1981); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 59-603 (1976); Ky. REV. STAT. § 392.080 (Supp. 1980); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18A, §§ 2-
201, 202 (1981); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 3-203 (Supp. 1981); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
191, § 15 (West Supp. 1981); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 700.282 (West Supp. 1981); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 525.213 (1980); MISS. CODE ANN. § 91-5-25 (Supp. 1981); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 474.160
(Vernon Supp. 1980); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 72-2-701 to 707 (1981); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30-
2313 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 560:10 (1974); N.J. REv. STAT. tit. 3B § 8-1 (1983); N.Y. EST.
POWERS & TRUSTS LAW, § 5-1.1 (McKinney 1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-1 (1976); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 30.1-05-01 (1976); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.39 (Page Supp. 1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 84, § 44 (West 1970); OR, REV. STAT. § 114.105 (1979); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 2203 (Purdon
Supp. 1981); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 33-25-1 to 33-25-6 (1978); S.D. COMP, Laws ANN. § 30-5A-1
(Supp. 1981); TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-1-105 (1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-201 (1978); VT.
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spouse a stated proportion of the decedent's estate. 4° The consequent restrictions on
freedom of testation result from the states' interest in families and their support," and
the recognition of the surviving spouse's contribution to the decedent's estate. 42 Elective
share statutes prevent the testator from avoiding the familial responsibilities he or.she
faced while still living."s Thus, through the operation of elective share statutes, the family
can remain economically independent and the state avoids any duty to support."
While elective share statutes generally provide the surviving spouse with a share of
the property owned by the decedent at the time of death, 45 a decedent can, through
inter vivos transfers, remove assets from his estate and, consequently, from the reach of
the statute." These transfers usually take the form of gifts or trusts. Absent statutory
limitation, an inter vivos gift is a valid transfer and cannot be effectively challenged 'by
the disinherited spouse if the requirements for making a valid gift are fulfilled. 47 Thus,
regardless of the decedent's motivation, courts will sustain an inter vivos gift provided
there is proper donative intent and delivery of either the asset itself or a deed to the
property."
Similar to a gift, an irrevocable inter vivos trust can effectively disinherit a surviving
spouse by rendering the trust assets outside a decedent's estate. 49 The decedent can,
therefore, place property in trust for himself for life and, after his death, to a designated
beneficiary. 5° In most states, a spouse will not be entitled to a share of property held in
trust at the time of the testator's death. 5 '
Jurisdictions are split, however, on .the question whether the assets in revocable inter
vivos trusts constitute part of the decedent's estate subject to a statutory distributive
share." Courts and state legislatures have adopted various approaches to this question
and have developed three primary tests in determining whether an inter vivos trust will
effectively remove assets from a decedent's estate. 55 These tests are generally referred
to as the intent, reality, and control tests." This section of the casenote will outline the
elements of the respective tests and demonstrate manners in which certain states have
STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 402 (1974); VA. CODE tit. 64.1-13, 16 (1980); W. VA. CODE § 42-3-1 (1966);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 861.05 (West 1971 & Supp. 1979-1980); WYO. STAT. § 2-5-101 (1980).
4° See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.207 (West Supp. 1983) (30% of the fair market value of all
decedent's property except real property located out of state); low", CODE § 633.238 (1981) (one-
third of decedent's real and personal property); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-504, 59-603 (1976) (all
decedent's property if there are no surviving children or grandchildren, one-half of the property
if there are surviving children).
41 See W. MACDONALD, FRAUD ON THE WIDOW'S SHARE 24-25 (1960).
42 Kurtz, supra note 33, at 1061.
45 Mahoney, supra note 37, at 100.
"Id.
45 Bensing, Inter Vivos Trusts and the Election Rights of a Surviving Spouse, 42 KY. L.J. 616 (1954);
Note, Disinheritance of the Widow in New England, 44 B.U.L. REV. 534, 535 (1964).
46
 Note, supra note 45, at 536.
47 MACDONALD, supra note 41, at 187.
" Id.
49 See 1 A. Scorn, TRUSTS § 57.5, 509 (3d ed. 1967 Sc 1983 Supp.); MACDONALD, supra note 41,
at 6.
5° See A. Seerrr, supra note 49, § 57.5, at 509 & n.3.
• 51 A. Scorr, supra note 49, at 509.
u Id. at 509-11.
5' MACDONALD, supra note 41, at 5-6.
54 Id.
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applied them. In addition, two legislative attempts at providing surviving spouses with
equitable and effective protection against disinheritance, the Uniform Probate Code and
the Uniform Marital Property Act, will be discussed in this section.
A. The Intent Test
Under the "intent test,"55 a court determines whether assets held in a revocable inter
vivos trust constitute part of the decedent's estate for elective share purposes by focusing
on the decedent's motive in making a transfer. 58 The intent test is used to evaluate
revocable inter vivos trusts with respect to statutory share claims in, among others, New
Hampshire,57 Vermont, 58 Tennessee,59 Kentucky," and Missouri. 8 ' If a decedent, in
disposing of property, intended solely to deprive a surviving spouse of any rights he or
she may have obtained in the property through the state's election statute, courts in
these jurisdictions will hold the transfer void. 62 The form of the transfer — whether it
be an inter vivos gift, a gift causa mortis, a revocable inter vivos trust, or an irrevocable
inter vivos trust — is irrelevant in the court's inquiry into the transferor's subjective
intent."
In the 1890 case of Walker v. Walker,64 New Hampshire became one of the first states
to adopt the intent test. In Walker, the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that the
sole restraint on a husband's right to dispose of his property was that he could not make
conveyances with a view of defeating his wife's marital rights." In They v. Ibey, decided
in 1945, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire articulated this intent standard in terms
of "good faith"" and analogized the protection afforded widows' distributive share of
the estates of their deceased husbands to the statutory protection from fraud given to
creditors.67 Nineteen years later, in the case of Hamm v. Piper, the court ruled that the
55 While the intent test is primarily a common-law development, MACDONALD, supra note 41, at
103-08, some states have enacted statutory versions of the intent test. For instance, TENN. CODE
ANN. 1-1-105 (1984) states: "Any conveyances made fraudulently to children or others, with an
intent to defeat the surviving spouse of his distributive or elective share, is voidable at the election
of the surviving spouse." See also WIS. STAT. ANN. § 861.17 (1971) (allowing courts in equitable
proceedings to void "any transfer or acquisition of property ... made by the decedent ... for the
primary purpose of removing the property from the probate estate in order to defeat the rights of
the surviving spouse ....").
56 Note, supra note 45, at 537; see generally MACDONALD, supra note 41, at 98-119.
" See infra text accompanying notes 64-75.
56 See, e.g., Patch v. Squires, 105 Vt. 405, 165 A. 919 (1933); Dunnett v. Shields, 97 Vt. 419,
123 A. 626 (1924); Nichols v. Nichols, 61 Vt. 426, 18 A. 153 (1889); Thayer v. Thayer, 14 Vt. 107
(1842).
59 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Lance, 48 Tenn. 294 (1870); McIntosh v. Ladd, 20 Tenn. 445 (1840).
6° See, e.g., Benge v. Barnett, 309 Ky. 354, 217 S.W.2d 782 (1949); Payne v. Tatem, 236 Ky.
306, 33 S.W.2d 2 (1930); Murray v. Murray, 90 Ky. 1, 13 S.W. 244 (1890).
61 See, e.g., Potter v. Winter, 280 S.W.2d 27 (Mo. 1955); Merz v. Tower Grove Bank and Trust
Co., 344 Mo. 1150, 130 S.W.2d 611 (1939).
62 Note, supra note 45, at 537.
6' Id.
64 66 N.H. 390, 31 A. 14 (1890).
6' Id. at 396, 31 A. at 17.
86 93 N.H. 434, 435, 43 A.2d 157, 158 (1945).
6' Id. at 435-36, 43 A.2d at 158. The New Hampshire court asserted "[just as future creditors
are protected by statute from conveyances made with actual intent to defraud, similarly it is held
by judicial reasoning that wives should be protected with respect to their distributive shares in the




deceased spouse's intent is a question of fact to be determined in light of all surrounding
circumstances, including the financial situations of the parties at the time of the transfer
and the relationship of the parties to the transaction. 68
This intent test, as the Supreme Court of New Hampshire recently noted in Hanke
v. Hanke,69
 has been frequently criticized by scholars" and courts" alike. The test, when
based strictly on a subjective determination of the decedent's motivation, has been termed
unsatisfactory because of the unpredictability and difficulty in making such a determi-
nation." When the test allows a court to look at the objective circumstances surrounding
a transfer and to balance the equities involved, however, commentators have character-
ized the intent test as meritorious and just." In specifically addressing these criticisms
of the intent test, the Hanke court stated that the standard utilized by the New Hampshire
courts focuses on the objective manifestations of the transferor's intent." In addition,
according to the court, this form of the test strikes a proper balance between the
competing policies Of free disposition of property and protection of surviving spouses."
B. The Reality Test
While courts employing the intent test focus on motive, jurisdictions which apply
the reality test are concerned solely with the validity of the transfer." Under the reality
test, which is the primary mode of analyzing inter vivos transfers challenged under
elective share statutes in states such as Connecticut," Colorado," and Pennsylvania,"
the motivation of a transferor is immateria1. 80 Rather, the only grounds on which a
surviving spouse can invalidate a transfer is to find a defect in the conveyance, such as
a lack of donative intent or a lack of delivery.'
Since its decision in the 1824 case of Stewart v. Stewart," Connecticut has used this
"reality test" to evaluate inter vivos transfers for purposes of statutory distribution. Those
Connecticut cases which address widows' claims through the distribution statute to prop-
erty conveyed by the husband inter vivos have stressed that one spouse does not possess
" Hamm v. Piper, 105 N.H. 418, 420-21, 201 A.2d 125, 127 (1964).
69 Hanke v. Hanke, 123 N.H. 175, 178, 459 A.2d 246, 248 (1983).
70
 The Hanke court cited MACDONALD, supra note 41, at 117 and Note, Estate Planning: Validity
of Inter Vivos Transfers Which Reduce or Defeat the Surviving Spouse's Statutory Share in Decedent's Estate,
32 OKLA. L. REV. 837, 839-40 (1979), as examples of critics of the "intent" test.
7 ' The court cited Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 379, 9 N.E.2d 966, 968-69 (1937) ("[m]otive
or intent is an unsatisfactory test of the validity of a transfer of property"). See also Leonard v.
Leonard, 181 Mass. 458, 462, 63 N.E. 1068, 1069 (1902) ("the great weight of authority is that the
intent to defeat a claim which otherwise a wife might have is not enough to defeat the deed").
72 MACDONALD, supra note 91, at 118.
73 Note, supra note 70, at 840.
74 123 N.H. at 178, 459 A.2d at 248.
75 Id.
76 See generally MACDONALD, supra note 41, at 120-44.
" See infra text accompanying notes 82-91.
78 See, e.g., Wilson v. Lowrie, 77 Colo. 427, 236 P. 1004 (1925); Ellis v. Jones, 73 Colo. 516, 216
P. 257 (1923).
79 See, e.g., Carcilla v. Bondy, 353 Pa. 249, 44 A.2d 586 (1945); In re Rynier's Estate, 347 Pa.'
471, 32 A.2d 736 (1943).
90 See generally MACDONALD, supra note 41, at 120-44.
" Id.
82 5 Conn. 317 (1824).
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an interest in the property of the other before death." The Connecticut courts have
held that the distribution statute does not prevent a husband or a wife from disposing
of property in any, lawful way he or she pleases or from incumbering it by any lawful
agreement," regardless of motivation at the time of the conveyance."
In the 1964 case of Cherniak v. Home National Bank &. Trust Co.," for example, the
donor transferred the bulk of his property into a trust over which he retained the right
to income during his, life and the power to amend or revoke the trust. 87 Upon, his death,
the income was to be paid to the decedent's surviving brothers." The Connecticut
Supreme Court held that the trust was neither testamentary nor a fraud on the widow's
rights." The Cherniak court reasoned that since the surviving spouse had no right or
interest in the property of the decedent during his lifetime, a valid trust, agreement
could not be fraudulent as to her." One cannot be defrauded, the court continued, of
that to which he has no right,'
C. The Control Test
Finally, other courts, including those in Maine," New York," and Ohio," employ a
control test and will invalidate transfers which allow the donor to retain a degree of
control over the transferred property so great that the donor, in effect, never parts with
ownership of the property." Thus, although technically valid legal ownership may vest
in the trustee and valid equitable ownership in the beneficiary, a transfer may be inef-
fective in removing the assets from the donor's estate for purposes of distribution."Like
the reality test, the control test is an objective inquiry, and the subjective motivation of
the transferor is irrelevant 9 7
The state of Maine is one jurisdiction" which employs a control test. In Maine, a
married person has the right to deplete his or her estate, even with the intent to
" See Cherniak v. Home Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 151 Conn. 367, 371, 198 A.2d 58, 60
(1964); Stewart v. Stewart, 5 Conn. 317, 320 (1824).
84 Harris v. Spencer, 71 Conn. 233, 237,41 A. 773, 774 (1898).
Cherniak, 151 Conn. at 371, 198 A.2d at 60.
88 151 Conn. 367, 198 A.2d 58 (1964).
87 Id. at 368, 198 A.2d at 58.
88 Id.
99 1d. at 370-71, 198 A.2d at 59-60.
"Id. at 371, 198 A.2d at 60.
91 Id.
99 See infra text accompanying notes 99-102.
95 See, e.g., Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937).
" See, e.g., Harris v. Harris, 147 Ohio St. 437, 72 N.E.2d 378 (1948); Bolles v. Toledo Trust
Co., 144 Ohio St. 195,'58 N.E.2d 381 (1944).
95 See generally MACDONALD, supra note 41, at 67-97.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 The leading case in this area is Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937) (holding
that a transfer is void if "Ujudged by the substance, not the form, the testator's conveyance is
illusory, intended only as a mask for the effective retention by the settlor of the property which in
form he had conveyed"). Id. at 381, 9 N.E.2d at 969.
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circumvent the elective share statutes, provided the depletion is accomplished through
complete gifts." As long ago as 1905, however, in Wright v. Holmes, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Maine ruled that a transfer will be considered fraudulent to the spouse and
void if it "is a mere device or contrivance by which the husband, retaining to himself
the use and benefit of the property during his life, and not parting with the absolute
dominion over it, seeks at his death to deprive the widow of her distributive share."'°°
The court has reasoned in succeeding cases that it is irrational to allow a married person
to defeat the statutory share by creating trusts which appear to deplete the probate
estate but which reserve all the benefits of ownership.'°' Accordingly, a surviving spouse
can have a trust declared invalid upon proof that the decedent spouse did not intend to
relinquish ownership of the trust property at the time the trust was executed.'° 2
D. The Uniform Probate Code: The Augmented Estate Concept
In addition to the judicial standards created to effectuate the statutory protec-
tion of surviving spouses, a number of states have enacted legislation which broad-
ens the scope of the decedent's estate subject to election, thereby providing
greater protection for the surviving spouse. 1 °3 The most widely adopted example of
w See Staples v. King, 433 A.2d 407, 409 (Me. 1981); Lambert v. Lambert, 117 Me. 471, 104
A. 820 (1918).
Im 100 Me. 508, 513, 62 A. 507, 509 (1905).
"" See, e.g., Staples, 433 A.2d at 411 (citing Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 381, 9 N.E.2d 966,
969 (1937)).
102 Staples, 433 A.2d at 411,
'"' Legislative definitions of an augmented estate have been enacted by individual states, most
notably New York and Pennsylvania. The New York statute lists a number of transactions to be
considered as testamentary substitutes and thus included in the net estate subject to the surviving
spouse's right of election. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW, § 5-1.1(b) (McKinney 1981). Included
in the augmented estate are: gifts causa mortis; money deposited in a savings account in a bank or
similar institution in the decedent's name in trust for another person remaining on deposit at the
date of decedent's death; bank accounts held by the decedent and another person payable on death
to the survivor and remaining on deposit at the date of decedent's death; dispositions of property
made by decedent whereby the decedent and another held the property as joint tenants with a
right of survivorship or as tenants by the entirety; dispositions of property made by the decedent
whereby the decedent held the property, in trust or otherwise, to the extent that he expressly
retained, at the date of his death, either alone or in conjunction with another person, a power to
revoke the disposition or a power to consume, invade or dispose of the principal. Id.
The Pennsylvania statute also allows the surviving spouse to reach certain assets held or
conveyed inter vivos by the decedent which are normally beyond the scope of election statutes.
PENN. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 2203 (Purdon Supp. 1981). In addition to the property passing by will
or intestacy, the probate estate, in Pennsylvania, includes: property conveyed by the decedent during
the marriage over which the decedent reserved the use of the property or an interest in or power
to receive income from it; property conveyed by the decedent to the extent the decedent could
revoke the conveyance or consume, invade or dispose of the principal for his own benefit; property
conveyed during the marriage by the decedent to himself and another with right of survivorship
provided that at the time of death decedent had the unilateral power to convey absolutely or in
fee; survivorship rights conveyed to a beneficiary of an annuity contract to the extent it was
purchased by the decedent during the marriage and the decedent was receiving annuity payments
therefrom at the time of death; property conveyed by the decedent during the last year of his life
to the extent the aggregate amount conveyed to each donee exceeded $3,000. Id. Explicitly excluded
are conveyances made with the express consent or joinder of the surviving spouse, proceeds from
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this type of legislation is the "augmented estate"'" concept of the Uniform Probate
Code ("UPC" or "Code").'"
Under the UPC, a surviving spouse has the right to claim an elective share of one-
third of the decedent's augmented estate.'" The augmented estate is comprised of the
net probate estate'7
 plus the value of certain transfers of property by the decedent to
persons other than the surviving spouse.'" This concept extends the reach of the spouse's
elective share beyond the probate estate to include commonly used inter vivos transfers
which can be effective means of disinheritance."
The UPC stipulates that inter vivos transfers includible in the augmented estate,
and thus subject to the elective share, must occur during marriage and must be gratui-
tous.''° The value of transfers made for full and adequate consideration is, however, not
includible. Four such transfers are enumerated in the Code:"' transfers under which
the decedent retained the right to income from the property;112 transfers under which
the decedent retained a power to revoke, consume, invade or dispose of the principal
for his own benefit;"' transfers under which the decedent holds property with another
with right of survivorship;" 4
 and transfers made during the last two years of decedent's
life to the extent that the aggregate transfers to any one donee in either of the years
exceed $3,000."3
 If the decedent made the transfer with the written consent or joinder
of the surviving spouse, it is excluded from the augmented estate. 16
 The statute also
life insurance, interests under employee pension or death benefit plans, and property passing by
the decedent's exercise or non-exercise of any power of appointment given by someone other than
the decedent. Id.
' 44
 The UPC has been adopted in Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Kentucky,
Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, and Utah. See 8
U.L.A. 1 (1983). Of these fifteen states, however, six (Florida, Hawaii, Kentucky, Michigan, Min-
nesota, and Utah) have either significantly changed the augmented estate provisions or declined to
enact them at all, Volkmer, Spousal Property Rights at Death: Re-Evaluation of the Common Law Premises
in Light of the Proposed Uniform Marital Property Act, 17 CREIGHTON L. REV. 95,131-36 (1983). Three
other jurisdictions are community-property states (Arizona, Idaho, and New Mexico); thus, there
are only six common-law states that have adopted the augmented estate provisions of the UPC. Id.
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-202 (1982).
I"	 § 2-201.
The statute defines the net probate estate as "the estate reduced by funeral and administra-
tion expenses, homestead allowance, family allowances and exemptions, and enforceable claims
." Id. § 2-202.
'cm /d. § 2-202(1). Also includible in the augmented estate of the UPC is the value of certain
property owned or transferred by the surviving spouse. Id. § 2-202. Only property derived from
the decedent by means other than testate or intestate succession without full consideration is
included, see id. § 2-202(2)(i), and then only to the extent it is derived from the decedent. Id. § 2-
202(2). In other words, if, for example, the surviving spouse owned or transferred an asset paid
for wholly by the decedent, the entire value of the asset would be included. Conversely, if the
couple shared the purchase price equally, only half of the asset's value would fall within the
augmented estate. Transferred property is only included if, during the time of the marriage, it
was, in addition to being derived from the decedent, transferred to someone other than the
decedent. Id.
Kurtz, supra note 33, at 1012.
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE 2-202(1) (1982).
1/1 Id.
112 Id. § 2-202(1)(i).
113 Id. § 2-202(l)(ii).
14 Id. § 2-202(I)(iii).
Id. § 2-202(1)(iv).
14 Id. § 2-202(1).
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explicitly excludes "any life insurance, accident insurance, joint annuity, or pension
payable to a person other than the surviving spouse."'"
E. The Uniform Marital Property Act
The Uniform Marital Property Act ("UMPA" or "Act") is another legislative effort
aimed at providing surviving spouses equitable and effective protection against disin-
heritance."' The UMPA drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws in 1983 19 seeks to define the property rights of spouses during
marriage and upon dissolution or death.'" The Act is, essentially, a community-property
proposa1 121 founded on two basic propositions. The creation of an immediate "sharing
mode" of ownership is the first concept the UMPA incorporates.' 22 The second propo-
sition is that the sharing mode during marriage is an ownership right already in existence
at the end of a marriage.I 23
This sharing mode is effectuated through a distinction drawn between "marital
property" 124 and "individual property." 125 The UMPA treats all property acquired by the
personal efforts of either spouse during the marriage as marital property. 126 Each spouse
has a present undivided one-half interest in all marital property. 127 Property brought
into a marriage 128 or acquired afterward by gift or devise' 29 is classified as individual
property. The appreciation of these assets remains individual property but any income
received from these assets, or, for that matter from any source whatsoever during the
marriage, constitutes marital property.'"
This distinction between individual and marital property becomes the basis for the
disposition of property at the end of a marriage. Section 17 of the Act outlines the
means of dividing property upon dissolution."' Section 18 deals with the treatment of
property upon the death of either spouse."2
112 Id.
" 8 UNIFORM MARITAL PROPERTY ACT (1985).
" 9 Id. historical note.
' 20 Id. prefatory note.
' 2 ' UMPA: The Uniform Marital Property Act, 10 COMM. PROP. J. 279, 279 (1983).
122 UNIFORM MARITAL PROPERTY ACT prefatory note (1982). The drafters stated, "[t]he Uniform
Marital Property Act makes its appearance on that stage to offer a means of establishing present
shared property rights of spouses during the marriage. This approach is bottomed on two propo-
sitions. The first is creation of an immediate sharing mode of ownership." Id.
123 Id. The prefatory note further states, "[t]he second proposition is that the sharing mode
during marriage is an ownership right already in existence at the end of a marriage." Id.
' 24 Id. § 4.
12s Id.
126 Id.
127 Id. § 4(c).
12E1 Id. § 4(f ).
122 Id. § 4(g).
' 5° Id. § 4(d).
1 " Id. § 17.,Dissolution is defined as "termination of marriage by a decree of dissolution, divorce,
annulment, or declaration of invalidity; or entry of a decree of legal separation or separate main-
tenance." Id. § 1(7). "After a dissolution, each former spouse owns an undivided one-half interest
in the former marital property as a tenant in common except as provided otherwise in a decree or
written consent," Id. § 17.
122 Section 18 of the UNIFORM MARITAL PROPERTY ACT provides:
At the death of a spouse domiciled in this State, all property then owned by the spouse
that was acquired during marriage ... must be treated as if it were marital property.
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Under the UMPA, when one spouse dies the surviving spouse continues to own a
one-half undivided interest in the marital property.'" Similarly, the one-half undivided
interest in the marital property of the deceased spouse is subject to disposition at death,
as is any other property owned by the decedent.' 54
 Thus a decedent's marital property
interest may pass either through testate or intestate succession.' 35
 An attempt to dispose
of more than the decedent's property interest would amount to interference with the
ownership right of the other spouse and would, therefore, be a nullity.' 36
The authors of the UMPA recommended that states adopting the Act limit or
eliminate the elective share rights of the surviving spouse.' 57
 The drafters reasoned that
the marital property system already establishes effective statutory sharing for the survivor
and, thus, a further elective right is neither necessary nor appropriate.'" Therefore, if
any additional elective rights are to remain, the authors assert that these rights should
be restricted to the decedent's individual property or other property in which the
surviving spouse acquires no interest under the Act.' 35
F. Summary
A number of measures, then, have been created by both the courts and state
legislatures in an attempt to preserve the integrity of surviving spouses' statutory share.
In many states, inter vivos transfers are judicially tested for either fraudulent intent,'40
lack of reality, 141 or excessive controP 42
 before being upheld. Other states have enacted
more precise legislation which defines the estate subject to distribution to include certain
enumerated transfers. 145
Massachusetts has utilized a variety of these measures in search of the proper balance
between the conflicting policies of maintaining free disposition of property and protect-
ing married persons from disinheritance. The law in Massachusetts has, at different
times, recognized elements of all three of these tests as influential in statutory share
cases. Sullivan illustrates that control is now, once again, a primary concern of the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in its construction of the state elective share
statute.
At the death of a spouse domiciled in this State, any property of the spouse which can
be traced to property received by the spouse ... as a recovery for a loss of earning
capacity during marriage must be treated as if it were marital property.
Id.
"3 Id. § 18 comment.
"4 Id.
"5 Id.
1 '6 Id. The comment provides that "[MI) attempt to dispose of more than the decedent's interest
in marital property would be no different from an attempt to dispose of any other property a
person did not own — it would be a nullity. It would amount to interference with the ownership




"° See supra text accompanying notes 55-75.
"I See supra text accompanying notes 76-91.
142 See supra text accompanying notes 92-102.
13 See supra text accompanying notes 103-39.
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II. THE LAW IN MASSACHUSETTS BEFORE SULLIVAN
Originally, in Massachusetts, the decedent's motive for transferring property as well
as the control which he maintained over the property during his life were considerations
in the courts' decisions on the validity of inter vivos conveyances.'" For instance, in the
1899 case of Brownell v. Briggs, 145 a husband conveyed all of his real estate to his
grandniece but reserved the use of the land for his life, and the power to sell or mortgage
the property and to dispose of the proceeds as he saw fit. 146 After the husband died
intestate, 149 the wife brought an action claiming the conveyance was void because it
deprived her of her statutory rights 149 in her late husband's property. The Brownell court
held that the conveyance defrauded the widow of her rights in the property. 19 According
to the Brownell court, "a voluntary transfer or conveyance by which the husband, re-
serving to himself a benefit from or power of disposal over the property, parts with its
ownership for the purpose of defeating his wife's interest in his estate, may be declared
void . . . "193 The court noted that a husband could not, through a will, have deprived
his widow of her statutory rights in his property, and reasoned that intestates similarly
should be prevented from defeating, through inter vivos conveyances, the property
rights of surviving spouses."' Thus, the court's determination was based on a combi-
nation of the control and intent tests.
In succeeding cases, however, Massachusetts courts factually distinguished Brownell
and emphasized that intent alone was insufficient to invalidate inter vivos transfers. 162
Further, during the next twenty years Massachusetts courts apparently abandoned both
control and intent as considerations in determining the validity of inter vivos convey-
ances. Instead, the courts' focus shifted to the "reality" of the transfer. In the 1904 case
of Kelley v. Snow,'" for example, the Supreme Judicial Court upheld a revocable inter
vivos trust despite retention by the donor of the power to use and collect income from
the trust corpus and the right to alter the terms of disposition at any time.'" Moreover,
the court ruled in favor of the trust despite the clear intention of the decedent to put
the trust property beyond the control of her husband.'" The Kelley court held that a
married woman has an absolute right, indefeasible by her husband, over her personal
estate.' 96 During her lifetime she may, according to the court, convey or give away her
144 See Brownell v. Briggs, 173 Mass. 529, 532, 54 N.E. 251, 252 (1899).
145 173 Mass. 529, 54 N.E.2d 251 (1899).
144 Id. at 530, 54 N.E. at 251.
1" Id.
148 Id. at 530, 54 N.E. at 252. The action was brought under St. 1880, c. 211; Pub. St. c. 124,
§ 3. which gave the widow of an intestate, who leaves no living issue, a right, in addition to her
estate in lieu of dower, to take the decedent's realty provided the value of the property did not
exceed $5,000. Id. at 531, 54 N.E. at 252.
' 49 Id. at 532, 54 N.E. at 252.
' 5° Id.
Id. at 533, 54 N.E. at 253.
152 See, e.g., Seaman v. Harmon, 192 Mass. 5. 7, 78 N.E. 301, 301 (1906) (wife had no right to
dower in real estate purchased by husband because he never obtained legal seisin of the land);
Leonard v. Leonard, 181 Mass. 458, 462, 63 N.E. 1068, 1069 (1902) (conveyance of real estate
upheld despite the husband's intent to eliminate wife's statutory interest in his estate).
153 185 Mass. 288, 70 N.E. 89 (1904).
' 54 Id. at 298-99, 70 N.E. at 94.
' 55 Id.
'56 Id.
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property in any manner and upon any terms she pleases, provided the conveyance is
real and not "colorable." 167 The court defined "not colorable" as meaning that the
conveyance must be legally binding on the settlor or donor, accomplished in his or her
lifetime and not testamentary in effect.' 99 The "colorable" restriction continued to be
the determinative factor in the court's evaluation of the validity of inter vivos transfers
relative to statutory distribution, while the donor's subjective intent became increasingly
unimportant. 199
Finally, in Kerwin v. Donaghy,'" decided in 1945, the Supreme Judicial Court com-
pletely eliminated the subjective intent of the testator as a consideration in evaluating
inter vivos conveyances for purposes of statutory share claims. In Kerwin, the decedent
customarily put his assets in the name of his daughter in order to defraud the govern-
ment for tax purposes.'" The decedent retained access to these funds at all times.' 62
After a disagreement with his wife, the decedent decided that he wanted his daughter
to receive these assets after his death.163 Accordingly, he set up two trust agreements
whereby his daughter was appointed trustee of substantially all of his property with
instructions to pay the income of the trust to the decedent for the remainder of his
life.'" Upon his death, the trust assets were to vest in the daughter.' 69 Decedent retained
the power to "alter, amend or revoke" the trust upon written notice to the daughter.'"
A few years after the creation of these trusts, and shortly before his death, the
decedent contacted his daughter to insure that his wife and other children would be
protected when he died.' 67 The decedent sought an assurance from his daughter that
she would do "the 'right thing' by his wife."'" Despite the daughter's assurances that
she would make provisions for her step-mother, her step-mother received virtually
nothing upon her husband's death.' 69
Decedent's widow brought an action under section 5 of Massachusetts General Laws,
chapter 230, seeking to have the trust assets declared part of her husband's estate for
purposes of evaluating her statutory share.'" The probate court ordered the daughter
to transfer the assets to the executors of her father's will."' On appeal, the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court 'upheld the trust agreements, reasoning that all the formal
"7 Id.
'S8 Kerwin, 317 Mass. at 572, 59 N.E.2d at 306.
' 59 See Roche v. Brickley, 254 Mass. 584, 588, 150 N.E.2d 866, 868 (1926) ("Nor does it render
the conveyance invalid that it was made to defeat any interest of the husband in the wife's property
upon her death. The right to deal with her personal property in her lifetime was absolute so far
as respected her husband, as long as the conveyance was not colorable.").
160
 317 Mass. 559, 59 N.E.2d 299 (1945).
'6' Id. at 562, 59 N.E.2d at 301.
162 Id.




167 Id. at 564, 59 N.E.2d at 302-03. The court noted that the decedent apparently forgot he
had the power to change or terminate trusts. Id. at 565, 59 N.E.2d at 303.
'" Id. at 564-65, 59 N.E.2d at 303.
169 Id. at 565, 59 N.E.2d at 303.
,70 /d. at 560, 59 N.E.2d at 301.
'7' Id.
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requirements for the creation of a trust were fulfilled and that the assets in question,
therefore, were not part of the decedent's estate. 172 The distribution statute, the court
reasoned, "does not extend to personal property that has been conveyed by the husband
in his lifetime" and, therefore, the widow had no rights in the trust property.'" In
reaching this holding, the court expressly overruled its previous position in Brownell v.
Briggs, 14 that the intent of the donor could control the validity of an inter vivos trust
for the purposes of assessing the estate under the Massachusetts elective share statute.'"
The decision of the Supreme Judicial Court in Kerwin eliminated any influence of
the donor's intent as a factor in evaluating the validity of inter vivos transfers for statutory
share purposes in Massachusetts cases. Furthermore, the court removed any doubt
concerning the standard to be used in the Commonwealth by enunciating a strict reality
test. After the Kerwin decision, a spouse's right to disinherit the surviving spouse through
an inter vivos transfer was limited solely by the requirement that the conveyance be
legally valid. Accordingly, the only grounds available to challenge such a conveyance in
Massachusetts were lack of donative intent, or lack of delivery.' 76
SULLIVAN V. BURKIN: A FURTHER RESTRICTION ON INTER VIVOS CONVEYANCES
In Massachusetts, the legal requirements for making a valid transfer remained the
only obstacles in disinheriting one's spouse through a revocable inter vivos trust for
nearly forty years until the case of Sullivan v. Burkin was decided in 1984.' 77 In Sullivan
the Supreme Judicial Court redefined "estate," for purposes of distribution under the
elective share statute,' 76 to include assets held in a trust over which the decedent alone
retained the power to direct disposition. 179
In a unanimous opinion, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court concluded that
the Edward G. Sullivan Trust was not testamentary and was an effective, valid inter
vivos trust.'" The court relied on a long line of Massachusetts cases, which had held
that the retention by the settlor of the rights to modify or revoke the trust, or to receive
income, or to invade the principal during his lifetime, does not impair the validity of
172 Id. at 566-67, 59 N.E.2d at 303-04.
173 Id. at 571, 59 N.E.2d at 306.
Id.
' 75 Id. The court stated that:
[On this Commonwealth a husband has an absolute right to dispose of any or all of
his personal property in his lifetime, without the knowledge or consent of his wife,
with the result that it will not form part of his estate for her to share under the statute
of distributions, [predecessor of G.L. c. 191, § 15] under his will, or by virtue of a
waiver of his will. That is true even though his sole purpose was to disinherit her.
(Citations omitted). So far as it may conflict with the foregoing decisions, the case of
Brownell v. Briggs (citation omitted) is no longer controlling.
Id.
176 Rock v. Rock, 309 Mass. 44, 47, 33 N.E.2d 973, 975 (1941) (a gift requires proof of an actual
or symbolic delivery coupled with a present donative intent).
'" 390 Mass. 864, 460 N,E.2d 572 (1989).
" B MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 191, § 15 (West Supp. 1981). See supra note 2.
179 390 Mass. at 872, 460 N.E.2d at 577.
1" Id. at 867, 460 N.E.2d at 574.
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the trust. 18 ' Similarly, according to the court, the trust was not invalid as a testamentary
disposition merely because the settlor was the sole trustee.'" The court found that the
law in Massachusetts was in accord with the Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 57, com-
ment h (1959), which reads:
The [trust] is not testamentary and invalid for failure to comply with the
requirements of the Statute of Wills merely because the settlor-trustee re-
serves a beneficial life interest and power to revoke and modify the trust.
The fact that as trustee he controls the administration of the trust does not
invalidate it.'"
The court then addressed the question of whether the trust assets were a "portion
of the estate of the deceased" in which the widow had a cognizable right under section
15 of Massachusetts General Laws, chapter 191. The longstanding rule in the Common-
wealth, the court noted, was that the statutory rights of surviving spouses did "not extend
to personal property that has been conveyed by the husband in his lifetime and does
not form part of his estate at his death."I 84 This rule, the court found, applied regardless
of the testator's subjective motivation for the conveyancel" or of the lack of knowledge
or consent to the transfer by the surviving spouse.' 86
 Accordingly, the court held that
Mary A. Sullivan had no right to share in the Ernest G. Sullivan Trust assets under
section 15 of Massachusetts General Laws, chapter 191 despite her husband's retention
of a general power of appointment.'"
The court, however, prospectively ruled that the rights of surviving spouses would
no longer be so restricted.'" Overruling Kerwin v. Donaghy,' 89 the court held that hence-
forth a decedent's estate shall include, for the purposes of the elective share statute, the
value of assets held in an inter vivos trust created by the deceased spouse as to which
the deceased spouse alone retained the power during his or her life to direct the
disposition for his or her benefit.'" Thus, the court explained, property held in trust
'"' Id. at 868, 460 N.E.2d at 575 (citing Ascher v. Cohen, 333 Mass. 397, 400, 131 N.E.2d 198
(1956); Leahy v. Old Colony Trust Co., 326 Mass. 49, 51, 93 N.E.2d 238 (1950); Kerwin v. Donaghy,
317 Mass. 559, 567, 59 N.E.2d 299 (1945); National Shawmut Bank v. joy, 315 Mass. 457, 473-75,
53 N.E.2d 113 (1944); Kelley v. Snow, 185 Mass. 288, 298-99, 70 N.E. 89 (1904)).
182 390 Mass. at 868, 460 N.E.2d at 575 (citing National Shawmut Bank v. Joy, 315 Mass. at
476-77, 53 N.E.2d 113 (1944)).
188 390 Mass. at 870, 460 N.E.2d at 575.
184 /d. at 870, 460 N.E.2d at 576 (quoting Kerwin v. Donaghy, 317 Mass. at 571, 59 N.E.2d at
299 and citing Fiske v. Fiske, 173 Mass. 413, 419, 53 N.E. 916 (1899); Shelton v. Sears, 187 Mass.
455, 73 N.E. 666 (1905)).
189 390 Mass. at 870, 460 N.E.2d at 576.
' 88 Id.
189 Id. at 871, 460 N.E.2d at 577.
In Id. at 872, 460 N.E.2d at 577.
189
 317 Mass. 559, 59 N.E.2d 299 (1945).
'" 390 Mass. at 867, 460 N.E.2d at 574-75. Despite holding that the Ernest G. Sullivan Trust
assets were beyond the reach of the distribution statute, the court stated that
[for the future, however, as to any inter vivos trust created or amended after the date
of this opinion, we announce that the estate of a decedent, for the purposes of G.L.
c. 191, § 15, shall include the value of assets held in an inter vivos trust created by the
deceased spouse as to which the deceased spouse alone retained the power during his
or her life to direct the disposition of those trust assets for his or her benefit, as, for
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would remain part of the estate, for distribution purposes, if the decedent exercised a
power of appointment or revoked the trust. 191
In redefining "estate" for purposes of the elective share statute, the court reasoned
that public policy considerations bearing on the absoluteness of the right of a spouse to
dispose of his or her property had changed significantly since it decided Kerwin v.
Daneighp2 in 1945. 195 The court analogized the property rights of surviving spouses to
those of spouses party to a divorce, and noted that the interests of one spouse in the
property of another upon divorce has increased substantially under current law.'" Under
the Massachusetts alimony statute, Massachusetts General Laws chapter 208, section
34, 195 a spouse can be awarded all of the estate of the other upon divorce. The court
reasoned that it was neither equitable nor logical to extend greater property rights to a
divorced spouse than to a widowed one. 196
Accordingly, the court adopted a test which would treat the assets of an inter vivos
trust created during the marriage by the deceased spouse as part of the decedent's estate
for purposes of the election statute if the deceased spouse alone had a general power of
appointment. 197 According to the court, this standard would eliminate the necessity of
example, by the exercise of a power of appointment or by revocation of the trust.
Id.
191 Id.
193 See supra text accompanying notes 160-76.
' 93 390 Mass. at 871-72, 460 N.E.2d at 577.
194 Id. at 872, 460 N.E.2d at 577.
' 93 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 34 (1983) states:
Upon divorce or upon a complaint in an action brought at any time after a divorce,
whether such a divorce has been adjudged in this commonwealth or another jurisdic-
tion, the court of the commonwealth, provided there is personal jurisdiction over both
parties, may make a judgment for either of the parties to pay alimony to the other.
In addition to or in lieu of a judgment to pay alimony, the court may assign to either
husband or wife all or any part of the estate of the other. In determining the amount
of alimony, if any, to be paid or in fixing the nature and the value of the property, if
any, to be so assigned, the court after hearing the witnesses, if any, of each party, shall
consider the length of the marriage, the conduct of the parties during the marriage,
the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills,
employability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties and the opportunity
of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income. The court may also consider
the contribution of each of the parties in the acquisition, preservation or appreciation
in value of their respective estates and the contribution of each of the parties as a
homemaker to the family unit. When the court makes an order for alimony on behalf
of a spouse, and such spouse is not covered by a private group health insurance plan,
said court shall determine whether the obligor under such order has health insurance
on a group plan available to him through an employer or organization that may be
extended to cover the spouse for whom support is ordered. When said court has
determined that the obligor has such insurance, said court shall include in the support
order a requirement that the obligor exercise the option of additional coverage in
favor of such spouse.
Id.
'96 390 Mass. at 872, 460 N.E.2d at 577. The court stated that "it is neither equitable nor logical
to extend to a divorced spouse greater rights in the assets of an inter vivos trust created and
controlled by the other spouse than are extended to a spouse who remains married until the death
of his or her spouse." Id.
197 Id. at 871, 460 N.E.2d at 577. The court ruled prospectively, stating, "lwile announce for
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making "the rather unsatisfactory" determinations previously made by the Massachusetts
courts,'" and of using the subjective or vague factual tests employed by other jurisdic-
tions.'"
The court pointed out, however, that this standard will be of little help in future
cases which are factually dissimilar from Sullivan. 2" The court suggested that different
rules may eventually be needed to resolve other fact situations."' Thus, according to the
court, the test enunciated in Sullivan might be inapplicable to trust assets conveyed to a
trust by a third person, 202 or if a decedent holds a power of appointment jointly with
another person,205 or if a surviving spouse has assented to the creation of a given trust?"
Moreover, the Sullivan court acknowledged that several important questions, such as the
issues of what assets should be used to satisfy the surviving spouse's claim to the value
of the transferred property, 205 or whether assets held in an inter vivos trust over which
a decedent retains a power of appointment should also be considered part of the estate
for purposes of intestate succession, were left unanswered by its decision. 2" The court
also expressly declined to resolve how to deal with trusts created before marriage or
with assets that pass through means other than a wil1,207 such as insurance policies over
which a deceased spouse had contro1. 2"
The court concluded its opinion by inviting the legislature to resolve the question
of the rights of a surviving spouse in the estate of the deceased spouse. 2" Following its
request for legislative action, the Sullivan court cited sections 2-201 and 2-202 of the
Uniform Probate Code° and section 18 of the Uniform Marital Property Act 2" The
court's reference to these statutes suggested it would consider similar legislation appro-
priate in Massachusetts. Pending enactment of such legislation, the court stated that "the
answers to these problems will 'be determined in the usual way through the decisional
process.-212
the future that, as to any inter vivos trust created or amended after the date of this opinion, we
shall no longer follow the rule announced in Kerwin v. Donaghy." Id.
198 Id. at 8;3, 460 N.E.2d at 577. The court stated that it will not "have to participate in the
rather unsatisfactory process of determining whether the inter vivos trust was, on some standard,
'colorable,' 'fraudulent,' or 'illusory. — Id.
199 Id. at 872-73, 460 N.E.2d at 577. According to the Sullivan court, a court need not
engage in a determination of "whether the [spouse] has in good faith divested himself
of ownership of his property or has made an illusory transfer" (Newman v. Dore, 275
N.Y. 371, 379, 9 N.E.2d 966 [1937]) or with the factual question whether the spouse
"intended to surrender complete dominion over the property" (Staples v. King, 433
A.2d 407, 411 [Me. 1981)).
Id.




2,4 1d. at 873, 460 N.E.2d at 577-78.





210 See id. These sections are discussed supra at text accompanying notes 103-17.
211 See 390 Mass. at 873-74, 460 N.E.2d at 578; this section is discussed supra at text accom-
panying notes 118-39.
212 390 Mass. at 873, 460 N.E.2d at 578.
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IV, THE INADEQUACY OF THE SULLIVAN DECISION
In Sullivan v. Burkin, the Supreme Judicial Court overruled Kerwin v. Donaghy and
held that prospectively, for purposes of distribution under the Massachusetts elective
share statute, assets held in an inter vivos trust created during the marriage by the
deceased spouse over which he or she alone had a general power of appointment will
constitute part of the decedent's estate. 2" The court explicitly stated, however, that this
decision might not be applicable in fact situations differing from the one in Sullivan.2"
The court also explicitly left unresolved when other types of inter vivos conveyances are
to be considered part of the estate under the Massachusetts elective share statute. 216
The next section of this casenote will assert that, while it was necessary for the court
to overrule Kerwin v. Donaghy, 216 the new rule adopted by the court is incomplete. 2" The
casenote will then discuss the court's recommendations for new legislation and will
conclude that the court should not have deferred the resolution of related issues to the
legislature.216 Next, the casenote will contend that the Supreme Judicial Court should
have set forth a widely applicable standard to provide guidance for practitioners." 6
Finally, the casenote will conclude with legislative suggestions to improve and clarify
statutory share law in Massachusetts. 2"
A. The Sullivan Court's Resolution of the Problems Resulting from the Kerwin Rule
The Massachusetts elective share statute 2" was enacted, as were similar statutes in
virtually all other states,222 to protect surviving spouses from disinheritance. 229 The major
difficulty in enacting an elective share statute is affording surviving spouses adequate
protection from disinheritance without overly restricting a settlor's freedom of testa-
tion.224 In Kerwin v. Donaghy, the protections contained in the Massachusetts statute were
virtually eliminated in favor of allowing unrestricted, absolute freedom of testation. 226
The rule adopted in Kerwin in 1945 allowed a spouse to circumvent the elective share
statute, and effectively disinherit the surviving spouse, by removing assets from the estate
subject to distribution.226 Thus, the statute, and the protection it afforded, could be
rendered totally ineffectual by a spouse's inter vivos transfers. The only restriction on
these transfers was that they must have been actual conveyances or gifts. 227 Therefore,
the elective share statute was not an obstacle for a married person, with access to a
lawyer, who wished to disinherit his or her spouse.
213 Id. at 872,460 N.E.2d at 577.
4 l 4 Id. at 873,460 N.E.2d at 577.
215 Id. at 873,460 N.E.2d at 577-78.
216 371 Mass. 559,59 N.E.2d 299 (1945). See also discussion infra text accompanying notes 221—
29.
217 See infra text accompanying notes 230-38.
218 See infra text accompanying notes 239-62.
219 See infra text accompanying notes 263-70.
220 See infra text accompanying notes 271-82.
221 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 191, 15 (West Supp. 1981). See infra note 2.
222 See supra text accompanying notes 37-42.
223 MACDONALD, supra note 41, at 24-25.
224 See Mahoney, supra note 37, at 99-101.
223 317 Mass. at 571,59 N.E.2d at 306.
226 Id.
227 Id.
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Moreover, the Kerwin court's application of the statute failed to recognize equally
the contributions of husbands and wives. A surviving spouse had essentially no property
rights, under Kerwin, unless he or she held tide to that property. In other words, the
spouse . holding title to the property could dispose of it at death regardless of whether
the surviving spouse contributed to the acquisition of the property. Therefore, for
example, a wife who throughout the marriage helped accumulate and maintain the
couple's assets could, under Kerwin, be deprived of the use of those assets upon the
death of her husband.
1. The Unresolved Issues
The Supreme Judicial Court correctly realized that Kerwin v. Donaghy is incompatible
with the current view of the contributions made to a marriage by both husbands and
wives. In overruling Kerwin, however, the Sullivan court left many questions unanswered
because its holding was too narrow to replace adequately the previous standard. Although
the Kerwin decision was not, in hindsight, a very equitable one, it was easily applicable
to virtually all similar situations. The standard created in Kerwin allowed a married
person to dispose of property in any manner he or she chose, provided the disposition
was formalistically correct.228 Thus, in the case of inter vivos trusts, for example, it was
largely irrelevant who had a general power of appointment, or whether the surviving
spouse assented to the creation of the trust for purposes of the elective share.
The rule adopted in Sullivan, unlike that in Kerwin, is not universally applicable. In
fact, the Sullivan court cannot truly be said to have adopted a "standard" or a "test" 229
at all. In essence, the court imposed a rule to govern one, very specific fact situation.
The applicability of this rule — that assets held in an inter vivos trust created during
the marriage by the deceased spouse over which he or she alone had a general power
of appointment — is, by the court's admission, unresolved. 230 Therefore, numerous
situations which had previously been governed by Kerwin are no longer controlled by
any precedent. Consequently, estate planners now must deal with an incomplete body
of law.
The Sullivan decision thus provides surviving spouses with greater protection than
they previously enjoyed by eliminating one of the mechanisms of disinheritance, namely,
inter vivos trusts over which the deceased spouse alone had a general power of appoint-
ment. As the court pointed out, however, its decision may be factually inapplicable to
future situations which vary only slightly from that encountered in Sullivan."' Hence, it
is unclear whether other vehicles for disinheritance have survived.
In overruling Kerwin, the Sullivan court should have either set forth a standard or
expanded its reasoning to provide practitioners with a basis for applying the court's
decisions to other fact patterns. The court was apparently unsatisfied with the judicial
standards which had been used in Massachusetts and in other jurisdictions. 232 The court
228 Id. at 571-72, 59 N.E.2d at 306.
229 The court claims that it adopted an "objective test" which "would involve no consideration
of the motive or intention of the spouse in creating the trust." 390 Mass. at 872, 460 N.E.2d at 577.
230 /d. at 873, 460 N.E.2d at 577.
331 See id.
232 See id. at 871-73, 460 N.E.2d at 577.
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expressly rejected the reality,"' intent, 2" and control tests. 2" Since the court was unsa-
tisfied with the existing judicial tests it should have explained the decision reached in
Sullivan in greater depth.
The reasoning in Sullivan is scant. The court tells us that surviving spouses "should
not be so restricted as they are by the rule in Kerwin v. Donaghy"236 and that a divorced
spouse should not have greater rights than a widowed one" and little else. The Sullivan
opinion provides virtually no guidelines for determining which factors led the court to
rule that assets held in inter vivos trusts created by the deceased spouse over which he
or she alone had a general power of appointment should be considered part of the
decedent's estate. The court's limitation of its rule to situations involving only a sole
power of appointment suggests that perhaps the decedent's control over the assets was
determinative. This, however, is little more than conjecture, and there is no indication
of how much control would be considered excessive by the court. Moreover, the court's
reliance on the comparative rights of the spouse in divorce settlements and inheritance
claims provides no concrete guideline for estate planners to predict how the court may
eventually resolve the questions it left unresolved. 2"
2. The Analogy to Divorce
The court's conclusion that it is "neither equitable nor logical" to extend greater
property rights to divorced spouses than to surviving spouses suggests that, absent new
legislation, the court's determination of whether assets may be reached by a surviving
spouse will depend on whether the spouse would have had a right to those assets had
he or she divorced the decedent. 2" To determine a surviving spouse's statutory share
based on what that spouse may have been awarded in a hypothetical divorce proceeding
is, however, neither equitable nor logical. Very different considerations govern the
determination of spouses' property rights upon divorce than upon death. The judge in
a divorce proceeding has wide discretion over the division of a couple's property. 240 He
"3 Id. at 871, 460 N.E.2d at 577. The court expressly overruled Kerwin, a "reality" test decision,
stating, "we shall no longer follow the rule announced in Kerwin." Id. For a discussion of the reality
test, see supra text accompanying notes 76-91.
2" 390 Mass. at 872, 460 N.E.2d at 577. The court stated that it would no longer consider the
motive or intention of the, spouse. Id.
2" Id. at 872-73, 460 N.E.2d at 577. The court stated that it will no longer need to determine
whether a spouse "'has made an illusory transfer' ... or ... whether the spouse 'intended to
surrender complete dominion over the property. — Id. (quoting Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371,
379 (1937) and Staples v. King, 433 A.2d 407, 411 (Me. 1981)).
236 390 Mass. at 872, 460 N.E.2d at 577.
"7 Id.
233 See id. at 872 n.6, 460 N.E.2d at 577 n.6. On this matter, the court asserted:
Without suggesting the outer limits of the meaning of the word "estate" under G.L.
c. 208, 34, as applied to trust assets over which a spouse has a general power of
appointment at the time of a divorce, after this decision there should be no doubt that
the "estate" of such a spouse would include trust assets held in a trust created by the
other spouse and having provisions such as the trust in the case before us.
2" Id. at 872, 460 N.E.2d at 577. Effectively, then, the definition of the term "estate" for the
purposes of the election statute would be the same as the meaning of "estate" under MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch . 208 § 34 (1983).
240 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 208 § 34 (1983), which states in part:
Id.
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must make the decision based on the unique facts of each case before him."' The
Massachusetts alimony statute authorizes the judge to consider a number of factors in
determining the amount of alimony, including the length of the marriage, the conduct
of the parties during the marriage, their respective employability and opportunity for
future acquisition of assets and income, and the contribution of each of the parties in
the acquisition and preservation of their respective estates. 242
Conversely, a judge in an elective share or intestate succession case does not have
this degree of discretion."' The present statute does not allow the judge to consider the
circumstances of the marriage in establishing the composition of the decedent's estate.244
The assets in question in such a case are either a part of the estate, as a matter of law,
and hence subject to the surviving spouse's election, or they are outside both the estate
and the reach of the statute."'
Therefore, an attempt to establish property rights of a surviving spouse by reference
to a spouse in a hypothetical divorce proceeding forces a judge to consider extrinsic
factors which are beyond the scope of inquiry provided for in the authorizing statute.
In addition, continued reliance by the courts on the Supreme Judicial Court's analogy
to divorce dispositions would provide a surviving spouse with virtually no basis for
deciding whether or not to elect against a will. Without some predictable standard for
determining which assets will be subject to distribution, surviving spouses may be unable
to ascertain whether a successful challenge of the will, under the distribution statute,
would result in a larger or smaller share of the decedent's estate than the original
testamentary provisions.
In addition, without a predictable standard, estate planners will be unable to struc-
ture a couple's estate to ensure that, upon the death of one spouse, the estate will be
distributed as the couple wished and intended. The number of questions remaining
unresolved following Sullivan will, in many instances, prevent estate planners from being
able to advise their clients with any certainty. it appears that Sullivan may just be the
first of a number of very fact specific, prospective rulings by the Supreme Judicial Court.
If that is the case, estates may have to be restructured quite often before the court
clarifies the state of the law by resolving the issues Sullivan raised.
In addition to or in lieu of a judgment to pay alimony, the court may assign to either
husband or wife all or any part of the estate of the other. In determining the amount
of alimony, if any, to be paid or in fixing the nature and value of the property, if any,
to be so assigned, the court after hearing the witnesses, if any, of each party, shall
consider the length of the marriage, the conduct of the parties during the marriage,
the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills,
employability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties and the opportunity
of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income. The court may also consider
the contribution of each of the parties in the acquisition, preservation or appreciation
in value of their respective estates and the contribution of each of the parties as a




242 See MASS. GEN. Laws ANN. ch . 191, § 15 (West Supp. 1981). For the text of this statute see
supra note 3.




3. The Conflicting Results under the Two Recommended Statutes
The Sullivan court stated that the definition of "estate" was best left to the
legislature246 and recommended, indirectly, that the Uniform Probate Code's statutory
treatment of distribution be adopted by the Massachusetts legislature. Under the UPC,
the Ernest G. Sullivan Trust would be considered part of the decedent's estate subject
to spousal election under section 2-202(1)(i) and 2-202(1)(ii) because he retained both
the right to receive income from the trust and the right to revoke it. Moreover, the
adoption of sections 2-201 and 2-202 or the enactment of similar legislation would
answer many of the questions which the court listed as specifically unanswered by its
opinion.247 For instance, the court noted that the situations of trust assets conveyed to
the trust by a third person or of assets held in a trust created with the consent of the
surviving spouse were unclear under the Massachusetts elective share statute following
Sullivan. 248 Under the UPC both these categories of assets would be outside the estate
subject to statutory distribution.249 Adoption of the UPC in Massachusetts would permit
ready resolution of several other questions left open by the Sullivan court, such as
whether trusts created prior to the decedent's marriage to the spouse 25° or whether
insurance policies payable to a person other than the surviving spouse constitute part of
the estate. 25 ' Analyzed under the UPC, the value of any assets held in either manner
would be excluded from the decedent's augmented estate and would, therefore, be
unavailable to a surviving spouse for statutory distribution. 252 Similarly, the Sullivan Court
left unresolved the status of assets held in a trust over which the decedent retained the
power of appointment jointly with another person253 or assets held in a trust created by
an intestate decedent who had a general power of appointment in the estate of the
deceased spouse. 254 Under the UPC, assets so held would be available for spousal distri-
bution.255
The Sullivan court also cited section 18 of the Uniform Marital Property Act (UMPA)
in its invitation for legislative action; 259 the result in Sullivan, however, is not consistent
with the UMPA. If the Sullivans had been residents of a state governed by the UMPA,
virtually all of Ernest Sullivan's personal property, valued at approximately $15,000, 257
would have been marital property because it was acquired during the marriage. 253 The
realty held in the trust, however, would be individual property because Mr. Sullivan
acquired that property as a result of his mother's death. 259 Thus, analyzed under the
245 390 Mass. at 873, 460 N.E.2d at 578.
245 See Id. at 873, 460 N.E.2d at 577-78.
248 390 Mass. at 871, 460 N.E.2d at 577.
2+9 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-202 (1982).
25° See 390 Mass. at 873, 460 N.E.2d at 578.
251
	 id.
252 See UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-202 (1982).
225 See id. The court noted that its opinion left the treatment of this situation unresolved. 390
Mass. at 873, 460 N.E.2d at 578.
254 See UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-202 (1982). The court expressly declined to offer a solution
to this situation as well. 390 Mass, at 873, 460 N.E.2d at 578.
255 See UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-202 (1982).
259 See 390 Mass. at 873-74, 460 N.E.2d at 578.
257
	
at 866, 460 N.E.2d at 574.
258 See UNIFORM MARITAL PROPERTY Acr § 4 (1982).
"9 See id. § 4(g).
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UMPA, Mrs. Sullivan would have had a one-half undivided interest in the personalty at
issue in Sullivan and no interest at all in the house held in trust. Mr. Sullivan would have
been free to dispose of both the house and his one-half interest in the personalty in any
manner he pleased.
It is apparent that the application of the two statutory schemes referred to by the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court to the facts of Sullivan would result in conflicting
outcomes — under the UPC Mrs. Sullivan would have a right to a statutory share of the
value of the entire trust corpus,26° while under the UMPA her interest would be limited
to one-half of the personalty held in the Sullivan trust. 26 ' In contrast to the outcome
under the UPC, Mrs. Sullivan would have no interest in the realty held in trust by her
husband under the UMPA. 262 Therefore, because the results upon their application
differ, these recommended statutes provide little insight into the court's likely resolution
of unanswered questions.
Following Sullivan v. Burkin, Massachusetts statutory share law is unpredictable and
fails to acknowledge the contributions of both husbands and wives. The scope of a
decedent's estate needs to be explicitly defined in Massachusetts. The judiciary has
declined to formulate a comprehensive definition and has left that task to the state
legislature. The Sullivan decision left a number of voids — unanswered questions —
which heed to be filled. Estate planning is not an area of the law in which imprecision
can be tolerated. The law needs to be settled, and settled clearly, to allow people to plan
for the disposition of their estates.
B. How Sullivan Should Have Been Decided
The Supreme Judicial Court had the opportunity to clarify the interpretation of
"estate" for purposes of statutory distribution and refused to do so. 263 The court explicitly
left the determination of surviving spouses' rights to the legislature. 264 The Massachusetts
legislature acted in this area by enacting the elective share statute, and can, as it has in
the past, amend it as it sees fit 265 The court's function is to interpret the laws promulgated
by the legislature.266 The inartful draftsmanship of these laws does not permit the court
to decline to answer the issues before it; the court must interpret the statute to best
effectuate legislative intent. 267 Similarly, the wisdom and policy of a statute are not
questions within the court's province; these determinations are solely for the legisla-
ture.2"
260 See UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-202 (1982).
26 ' See UNIFORM MARITAL PROPERTY ACT § 4 (1982).
"2 See id. § 4(g).
263
 See Sullivan, 390 Mass. at 873, 460 N.E.2d at 578.
1 Id.
263 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 191, § 15 was amended in 1964 to increase, in certain situations,
the share available to a surviving spouse from $10,000 to $25,000.
466 See Mass. Const. art. 30; Rosenbloom v. Kokofsky, 373 Mass. 778, 780, 369 N.E.2d 1142,
1143 (1977). The court stated that while "harsh results" were possible under the statute in question,
"the question whether an alternative formulation would be more equitable is beyond our authority
to decide. The scope of the authority of this court to interpret and apply statutes is limited by its
constitutional role as a judicial, rather than a legislative body." Id.
263
 Tedford v. Massachusetts Hous. Fin. Agency, 390 Mass. 688, 696, 459 N.E.2d 780, 785
(1984) (the court must "interpret the statute to best effectuate the legislative intent, viewing the
statute as a whole").
263 See, e.g., Bailey v. Wood, 202 Mass. 549, 551, 89 N.E. 147, 148 (1909) ("whether the statute
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The Supreme Judicial Court fulfilled its role by deciding the issue before it in
Sullivan v. Burkin, but by adopting an extremely fact-specific rule it confused the future
state of Massachusetts statutory share law. It is obvious from the numerous examples of
the decision's inapplicability that the court understood that the law would be unsettled
after Su/livan. 269 Moreover, it is clear that the court does not intend to clarify the law in
this area in the near future. The court stated that, absent new legislation, it would resolve
any unanswered questions "in the usual way, through the decisional process," 2" thus
implying these determinations would continue to be made on narrow, case-by-case bases,
as Sullivan was, until the legislature enacts a new statute or the court judicially creates
one.
The court apparently would prefer that the Massachusetts elective share statute
contain a very specific enumeration of exactly what assets are subject to distribution. In
Sullivan, the court attempted to induce the enactment of such legislation by intentionally
confusing the definition of "estate" for purposes of statutory distribution. The court
therefore allowed its views on the lack of wisdom or utility of the current statute to
interfere with its duty to interpret the law in accordance with legislative intent.
Neither the adoption of a standard nor the expansion of its reasoning would have
precluded the court from expressing its views on the deficiencies of the Massachusetts
elective share statute. Nor would it have precluded the court's recommendations on how
to alleviate those deficiencies. The course of action taken by the court showed a legitimate
concern for the future of the law in this area but it disregarded the interim between the
Sullivan decision and the possible enactment of new legislation. Accordingly, the Supreme
Judicial Court should have decided Sullivan v. Burkin in a manner which clearly illustrated
what would be includible within a decedent's estate for purposes of statutory distribution
so that practitioners could proceed with certainty regardless of whether a new statute is
enacted.
V. OBJECTIVES FOR A NEW ELECTIVE SHARE STATUTE
If the Massachusetts legislature is to enact a new elective share statute, both the
UPC and the UMPA provide worthwhile bases for eliminating the problems caused by
the current statute. The UPC is a comprehensive piece of legislation designed to reduce
imprecision and guesswork in the determination of which of a decedent's assets are
subject to distribution. The mechanics and framework of the UPC would be a sound
starting point for the Massachusetts legislature. A statute is needed which specifically
and completely enumerates the assets subject to statutory distribution.
The Massachusetts legislature should also draw upon the UMPA's recognition of
spousal property rights prior to termination of the marriage. In other words, a new
statute should provide that one spouse's legal interest in the other spouse's property
would not have to be triggered by death — it would exist during the marriage. As under
Massachusetts divorce law, legal title to property would not be determinative of its status
relative to the distributive share. 271 Massachusetts divorce laws, to some extent, already
... is a good statute or a bad statute ... is a matter for legislative consideration"); Opinion of the
Justices, 165 Mass. 589, 595, 44 N.E. 625, 627 (1896) (loin the wisdom of legislation we are
not the judges").
262 390 Mass. at 873, 460 N.E.2d at 578.
27°
	 at 874, 460 N.E.2d at 578.
271 See MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 208, 34 (1983)..
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reflect this type of system by considering "the contribution of each of the parties in the
acquisition, preservation or appreciation in value of their respective estates and the
contribution of each of the parties as a homemaker to the family unit" 222 in determining
the amount of the settlement or alimony, and, also by including all property of a spouse
"whenever and however acquired" in the estate subject to distribution upon divorce.223
A statute embodying this sharing concept would recognize the contributions of respective
spouses, without regard to which party holds legal title to given property, and would
treat married couples as a unit composed of equal partners.
This concept of equality of ownership as between spouses is one of the major
differences between the augmented estate scheme of the UPC and the community
property concepts underlying the UMPA. A second difference is that the UMPA takes
effect during the life of the marriage 274 and operates upon its dissolution. 228 Under the
UPC, one of the spouses must die for any sharing to occur. 276 Furthermore, there is,
effectively, only sharing when the spouse who holds legal title to the majority of a couple's
property dies first. 222
In addition to the UMPA, current scholars also embrace this concept of equality:
[A]ny new system of marital property rights should be based on the pre-
sumption that persons entering marriage are doing so on a basis of equality,
that their contributions to the marriage are likewise presumed to be equal,
and that the distribution of assets at its termination will reflect that pre-
sumption.278
In accordance with the presumed equality of spouses, new statutory share legislation
should deemphasize, for the purposes of distribution, the importance of which spouse
holds title to the property. The fact that an asset is held in one spouse's name is no
longer (if, in fact, it ever was) a clear indicium of the contribution to the acquisition of
the asset made by the respective spouses. As the Massachusetts divorce statute illustrates,
the legal system presently views husbands and wives on a more equal footing than may
have been the case in the past. The value of each spouse's role in the acquisition of
property and the maintenance of the family cannot be stated in precise monetary terms.
Nor can the fruits of a successful marriage be easily classified as "his" or "hers." The
divorce laws of Massachusetts, and those of the overwhelming majority of other states 2 79
recognize this situation.
Finally, a spouse's interests in marital property should be recognized before the
marriage terminates. This objective is also clearly at work in current divorce law, 28° the
272 Id,
273 See Rice v. Rice, 372 Mass. 398, 400, 361 N.E.2d 1035, 1037 (1977).
274 See UNIFORM MARITAL PROPERTY ACT § 4 (1982).
275
 See ed. §§ 17, 18.
276 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-201(a) (1982).
277 Volkmer, supra note 104, at 134.
278 Kulzer, Law and Housewife: Property, Divorce, and Death, 28 U. FLA. L. REV. 1, 46 (1975); see
also Foster & Freed, Marital Property Reform in New York: Partnership of Co-Equals?, 8 FAM. L.Q. 169,
176 (1974) ("We believe that such a system reflects the contemporary understanding of marriage
and the reasonable expectations of the parties.").
276 See generally Foster & Freed, Family Law in the Fifty States: An Overview, 16 FAM. L.Q. 289
(1983).
280 See, e.g., UNIFORM MARITAL PROPERTY ACT § 4, 17 (1982).
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Massachusetts divorce statute, 28 I and the Supreme Judicial Court's reliance on that statute
in Sullivan. 282 In broad terms, this recognition could be effectuated easily in Massachu-
setts through the imposition of a community-property system, but such an option is
incompatible with the present state of Massachusetts law.
CONCLUSION
in Sullivan v. Burkin, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court rejected the standard
established in 1945 which granted a spouse an absolute right to dispose of his or her
property and to evade the elective share statute. The Sullivan court prospectively adopted
a rule which treats assets held in an inter vivos trust created by the deceased spouse
during the marriage and over which he or she had a general power of appointment as
part of the decedent's estate subject to statutory distribution. The court expressly stated,
however, that this rule may be inapplicable to situations factually dissimilar to Sullivan.
The narrow holding in Sullivan leaves many unanswered questions, which the court
apparently intends to resolve on a case-by-case basis. The court intentionally confused
the law in this area to induce legislative action. Until the legislature acts, however, Sullivan
provides an uncertain precedent for estate planners, who need predictable guidelines
on which to plan the disposition of their clients' estates.
WALTER J. JENKINS
gal See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 208, § 34 (1983).
2a2
	
390 Mass. at 872, 460 N.E.2d at 577.
